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ABSTRACT
California is currently facing two massive problems: climate change 
and affordable housing. The issues of affordable housing and greenhouse 
gas emissions intersect in the instance of vehicle miles traveled – the amount 
of miles driven by Californians in a given amount of time. Local governments
have continuously excluded high density housing developments and
contributed to rapidly increasing housing costs. As a result, many
Californians must travel far distances between work and home. Increased
vehicle miles traveled results in increased greenhouse gas emissions.
Because local control has contributed to these problems, state regulation of 
vehicle miles traveled is needed to combat climate change and affordable
housing.
This Article analyzes the potential power of the California Air Resources 
Board (“CARB”) to enact land use regulations that would reduce vehicle 
miles traveled. California courts have historically held that land use
powers are local in nature. This local deference is a hurdle to CARB acting 
within the land use domain. However, AB 32 and SB 32 may provide
CARB with authority to take regulatory action that would preempt local 
control over land use. Also, SB 375 may provide CARB with authority to
institute zoning enforcement actions that would encourage housing 
development. Finally, the era of local land use power may be coming to
an end because of recent statutes that replace various aspects of local 
control with state control. Such a change should significantly weaken the 
judicial presumption of localized control. In the new land use regime, 
CARB should be able to reduce vehicle miles traveled through land use 
regulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California is striving to serve as a role model for other states and countries
in finding ways to mitigate its greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and 
lower its impact on climate change—all while maintaining a strong 
economy.1 California has passed a number of bills designed to reduce its 
GHG emissions, including AB 32, SB 32, and SB 375.2 
Transportation is California’s highest GHG emissions sector.3 While 
California has done well to address the emissions produced by each vehicle 
per-mile traveled, it has struggled to reduce the amount of vehicle miles 
traveled (“VMT”) overall.4 In large part because of California’s soaring 
housing costs, its population’s housing continues to be pushed further from 
places of work.5 In order to reach its goal of reducing GHG emissions to 
40% below 1990 levels by 2030, the California Air Resources Board 
(“CARB”) has recognized that reducing VMT must be part of any strategy 
evaluated.6 The state has begun to facilitate public-transportation development 
to address this problem, but it has failed to take adequate land use-related 
action that could address VMT. 
California has a land use tradition based in local government control, 
but it is now facing serious problems with housing and transportation that 
span across local borders. In its current land use framework, many of 
California’s local governments are using their control to prevent housing 
development and maintain their current culture and style.7 This behavior
benefits those who own homes at the expense of those seeking them and 
puts a strain on affordable housing by limiting supply.8 As a result, low 
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (West 2020). 
2.  See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 et seq. (West 2020)
(A.B. 32); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2020) (S.B. 32); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 65080 et seq. (West 2020) (S.B. 375). 
3. California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD ES1 
(Nov. 2017), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LVR2-ZC3U].
4. Id. at 75. 
5. Joanna D. Malaczynski & Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating the California Environmental Quality Act with 
the California Global Warming Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 81 (2009). 
6. California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan, supra note 3, at 75.
 7. See John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing
Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV. 823, 831 (2019). 
8. Id.
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income families are often forced to live far from where they work.9 The 
people affected by housing affordability are also likely the least able to 
upgrade to low-emission vehicles to reduce their transportation emissions. 
The state of California could intervene to solve the combined housing-
emissions problem using GHG reduction authority. CARB is the lead
agency tasked with regulating sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and 
it could arguably use its broad authority under AB 32 and other climate 
laws to implement land use mandates aimed at curbing vehicle miles
traveled. CARB could take action to (1) compel local jurisdictions to increase 
housing density near public transit, (2) compel local jurisdictions to comply
with regional housing goals generally by imposing penalties and offering 
incentives for compliance, and/or (3) institute enforcement lawsuits under 
SB 375 to compel local jurisdictions to comply with regional housing
goals.
A state-wide regulatory approach is likely the best way to minimize 
externalities from exclusionary localism.10 Ultimately, CARB’s broad 
authority under AB 32, combined with the erosion of the traditionally
local power over land use, gives CARB defensible positions in regulating 
VMT emissions. CARB can also likely take enforcement action as an 
“interested person” under SB 375 to enforce inclusive zoning. 
II. A FACTUAL BACKGROUND ON TRANSPORTATION
EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
A. The Current State of Climate Change
It is clear that humans are influencing Earth’s climate system, and 
recent anthropogenic emissions are the highest they have ever been.11 Our 
climate’s warming is unequivocal, and recent changes are unprecedented 
over millennia.12 Weather patterns are have become more erratic as a
result of increased average global temperatures, and these patterns are 
expected to increase in severity with continued warming.13 The impacts
of climate change include sea level rise, increased droughts, increased 
flooding, and increased severity of storms.14 These direct impacts will
have countless other consequences, including economic instability, food 
9. Malaczynski supra note 5, at 81. 
10. See infra at p. 69 for discussion on the externalities of localism.
 11. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 
SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 2 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/
uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R4Z-6K4H].
12. Id.
 13. Id. at 7. 
14. Id. at 10. 
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insecurity, water insecurity, disease, and forced migration of millions of 
people needing to escape worsening conditions.15 
B. The Current Analysis of California’s Emissions 
California is attempting to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions while 
strengthening its economy.16 Transportation is California’s highest greenhouse 
gas emissions sector.17 Transportation emissions are a “3-Legged Stool”
of sorts: they are affected by fuel efficiency, vehicle miles traveled, and 
fuel source. VMT refers to the distance California drivers travel. VMT 
corresponds with GHG emissions because VMT represents a necessary 
consumption of largely carbon-based fuel by California residents to travel 
between places of work and home. Californians’ housing continues to be 
pushed further from places of work in large part because of California’s 
soaring housing costs.18 
While California has done well to address the emissions produced by 
each vehicle, per-mile traveled, the State has struggled to reduce the total 
amount of vehicle miles traveled.19 In order to reach its goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030, CARB has 
recognized that reducing vehicle miles traveled must be part of any strategy 
evaluated.20 The state has begun to take action facilitating public-transportation 
development to address this problem, but it has failed to take adequate 
land use-related action that could address vehicle miles traveled.21 
C. Localities Avoid and/or Prevent Housing Developments and 
Increase Vehicle Miles Traveled 
California has a land use tradition based in local government control, 
but it is now facing serious problems with housing and transportation that 
15. Id. at 15–16. 
16. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (WEST 2020). 
17. California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES 
BOARD, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ZL9B-DUEH], at ES1. 
18. For a well-documented and detailed analysis of California’s current housing situation 
that cites to a wealth of studies on zoning and housing, see Infranca, supra note 7. 
19. Id. at 75. 
20. California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan at 75. 
21. See generally S.B. 375, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), available at
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=200720080SB375, 
[https://perma.cc/9M2Q-RJZH] [hereinafter “S.B. 375”]. 
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span across local borders. In its current land use framework, California’s
local governments are using their control to prevent housing development 
and maintain their current culture and lifestyle.22 This behavior benefits 
those who own homes at the expense of those seeking them and puts a 
strain on housing affordability by limiting supply.23 As a result, low 
income families are often forced to live far from where they work.24 The
people affected by housing affordability are also likely the least able to 
upgrade to low-emission vehicles to reduce their transportation emissions. 
In order to address the negative externalities of NIMBY (“Not In My Back 
Yard”) localism inherent in the current land use regime, a state-level 
regulatory program is needed. 
III. HISTORIC LEGAL BACKGROUND OF LAND USE
The legal background of land use in California illustrates who makes land 
use decisions in the state. Local governments have traditionally wielded
the bulk of the land use power in California. However, the California
Legislature wields the ultimate authority, and it has begun to take land use 
powers away from local governments.25 
A. Local Tradition: Local Governments Have Traditionally
Wielded the Authority to Regulate Land Use 
Since Euclid,26 the states have considered land use planning to be
primarily a local government function that stems from a city or county’s 
police power.27 California included this local authority in its constitution, 
allowing cities and counties to make and enforce “local, police, sanitary, 
and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”28 
California has a rich history of caselaw that has upheld the presumption 
22. See Infranca supra note 7, at 831; see also Senator Nancy Skinner Representing 
Senate District 9, California Legislature Approves SB 330,“Housing Crisis Act of 2019,” 
https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20190906-california-legislature-approves-sb-330-%E2% 
80%9Chousing-crisis-act-2019%E2%80%9D, [https://perma.cc/8C5Z-T8BC] (Sept. 6, 2019) 
(SB 330 rationale includes the fact that local governments are working to exclude housing,
which perpetuates the housing crisis).
23. See Infranca supra note 7, at 831. 
24. Malaczynski, supra note 5.
 25. See infra at 33. 
26.  Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
27. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (the Court explained that 
“The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is 
ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”). 
28.  Cal. Const. art. XI § 7. 
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that land use and zoning powers are a derivative of local police powers.29 
California’s statutes have followed the same trend, generally giving local 
jurisdictions broad authority to make decisions concerning the land within 
their geographic boundaries.30 
B. Limits of Local Tradition: Local Authorities Regulate 
Land Use Subject to State Law 
Importantly, the California Constitution reserves for the state the ultimate 
power to make “general laws” that would override or control local jurisdictions’ 
police power.31 In the past, California has made relatively few of these 
overriding laws pertaining to land use. Examples of past state intrusions
into local police power include mandates regarding general plans,32 building
codes, subdivision approvals,33 and detailed project review under CEQA.34 
In recent years, California has begun to pass more statutes aimed at 
reducing local control over certain aspects of land use because housing 
problems have reached crisis levels. In 2015, density bonus laws were 
amended to limit the number of parking spaces a locality could require for
affordable housing projects built near public transit.35 In 2016, AB 2501
required local governments to make density bonus laws more attractive to 
developers by streamlining and simplifying the approval processes for 
density bonuses.36 In 2017, the Legislature passed fifteen more bills related 
to housing. The Legislature streamlined urban infill development, reduced 
local jurisdictions’ discretion surrounding these projects, and created 
housing sustainability districts near public transit.37 
In October 2019, SB 330 (1) decreased the time local governments have 
to grant building permits, (2) barred local governments from reducing the 
number of homes that can be built, (3) barred local governments from 
29. See DeVita v. County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 782 (1995); see also Big Creek
Lumber Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 38 Cal. 4th 1139, 1159 (2006). 
30. See e.g., Cal Gov’t Code § 65030.1 (West 2020). 
31. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
32. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 (West 2020). 
33. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66410–66413.5 (West 2020). 
34. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 211000–21189.57 (West 2020). 
35. Infranca, supra note 7, at 848. 
36. Id.
 37. Id. at 849–50 (placing housing near public transit aims to reduce vehicular traffic.
Ideally, those living near public transit would use that instead of their personal vehicles on a 
daily basis.). 
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changing permit requirements once an applicant has submitted preliminary 
information, and (4) limited the number of public hearings a local 
government can impose on an application to a maximum of five.38 
These statutes erode California’s traditionally local land use regime. 
Courts have created a presumption against preemption that favors local
government control (instead of state control) over land use decisions39 
This presumption of local control stems from a traditional State intent that
local governments should control land use. However, by passing these 
new statutes, the Legislature has shown that local governments do not have
unrestrained land use authority anymore – and the local authority presumption 
may come to an end. 
IV. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AUTHORITY:
ENTERING THE LAND USE DOMAIN 
CARB has extremely broad discretionary authority under AB 32 and 
SB 32 that puts it in a unique position of power. Because of the vehicle 
miles traveled GHG emissions that stem from land use inefficiencies,
CARB arguably has the authority to regulate land use. There are many
ways in which CARB could influence land use to solve the “vehicle miles
traveled” problem, but this paper will consider only three. First, CARB 
could directly compel local jurisdictions to increase housing density near 
public transit. Second, CARB could compel local jurisdictions to comply 
with regional housing goals through penalties and incentives. Third, rather 
than regulate, CARB could institute enforcement lawsuits under SB 375 
to compel local jurisdictions to comply with regional housing goals. 
AB 32 and SB 32 may give CARB the authority to regulate land use, 
but AB 1493 may restrict this authority. Separately, SB 375 may grant 
CARB the power to institute zoning enforcement actions that would encourage 
housing development. Finally, CARB’s case for land use regulatory authority 
may be more viable because of recent legislative actions that likely weaken 
judicial presumptions against preemption of local land use powers. 
A. The Scope of CARB’s Land Use Authority Under AB 32 
AB 32 likely grants CARB authority over land use in order to regulate 
GHG emissions. CARB may also have discretion to preempt local government 
38. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5 (West 2020); see also Sen. Nancy 
Skinner, Rep. Sen. Dist. 9, California Legislature Approves SB 330,“Housing Crisis Act 
of 2019,” https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20190906-california-legislature-approves-sb-
330-%E2%80%9Chousing-crisis-act-2019%E2%80%9D [https://perma.cc/93P8-9J59] (Sept. 
6, 2019). 
39. See discussion infra p. 85. 
70



















   
      
      
[VOL. 12:  63, 2021] CARB v. Climate Change
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
law in the land use domain to implement CARB’s desired policies. However, 
AB 1493 may limit CARB’s authority under AB 32.
1. Interpretation of AB 32: CARB’s Land Use Authority Under AB 32 
The Legislature broadly wrote AB 32 to allow CARB to reduce GHG
emissions. To regulate land use under AB 32, CARB would need to find 
that land use inefficiencies or vehicle miles traveled are a source of GHG
emissions. CARB’s regulations would then need to withstand a preemption
challenge to control land use policy. 
a. The Plain Meaning and Legislative Intent of AB 32
Traditional canons of statutory construction include (1) allowing a statute’s 
plain meaning to control, (2) giving weight to the Legislature’s intent in
enacting the statute, and (3) considering reasonableness and public policy 
implications.40 Under these canons, AB 32 delegates broad discretionary
authority to CARB. The Legislature’s limitations on CARB’s authority 
are minimal. For example, a staff attorney for the League of California 
Cities notes that “AB 32 amounts to a very broad grant of authority to 
CARB: the board may take regulatory action over any source of emissions 
whenever it determines the action is necessary to achieve AB 32’s goal.”41 
The statute states that CARB “shall adopt rules and regulations . . . to
achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective GHG 
emission reductions from sources or categories of sources, subject to the
criteria and schedules set forth.”42 
California’s Legislature passed AB 32 in response to the “serious threat” 
climate change poses to the “economic well-being, public health, natural 
resources, and the environment of California.”43 The Legislature declared 
that global warming threatens California and its residents by (1) exacerbating 
air quality problems, (2) reducing water quality and supply, (3) raising sea 
levels to displace thousands of coastal businesses and residences, (4) 
damaging marine ecosystems and the natural environment, and (5) increasing 
40. See People v. Arias, 45 Cal. 4th 169, 177 (2008). 
41. Bill Higgins, Senior Staff Comm., League of Cal. Cities, Seminar Report at the
City Attorney One Day Seminar: Seven Things City Attorneys Should Know About 
Developments in State Law Related to Climate Change (Feb. 23, 2009) (recognizing the 
broad grant of discretionary authority to the state). 
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560 (West 2020). 
43. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a)(West 2020). 
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infectious diseases, asthma, and other human health problems.44 The
Legislature also declared that global warming threatens California’s largest 
industries, and strains California’s electricity supplies to meet summer 
demands for air conditioning.45 
The Legislature also declared that California has been a national and
international leader in environmental stewardship,  and that the program 
established by AB 32 “will continue this tradition of environmental leadership
by placing California at the forefront of national and international efforts” 
to reduce GHG emissions.46 To achieve these ends, the Legislature directed
that CARB “shall adopt rules and regulations . . . to achieve the maximum 
technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions from sources.”47 It required CARB to adopt GHG limits and 
emission reduction measures by regulation, without specifying which 
measures should be adopted.48 The Legislature only substantively constrained
CARB by requiring it to consider nine policy goals when designing the 
regulations.49 
Plainly put, CARB arguably has the discretionary authority to identify 
and regulate anything causing GHG emissions that CARB deems significant, 
so long as CARB considers the nine policy factors and uses the special
procedures the Legislature set forth.50 Why does CARB have this power? 
Because California’s health, economy, and beauty are seriously threatened 
by a nuanced issue that requires technical expertise and analytical skills 
beyond that which the Legislature directly possesses.51 The Legislature 
intended that CARB would address the new problems posed by climate 
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Code § 38501(b)(West 2020). 
45. Id.
 46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38501(c) (West 2020) (emphasis added). 
47. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560 (West 2020). 
48. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Code § 38562 (West 2020); Citizens Climate Lobby v.
Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013 WL 861396 at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 
2013).
49. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b) (West 2020). 
50. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38560, 38562 (West 2020); Cal. Chamber of
Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604, 626 (2017) (“The Act reflects the 
Legislature’s desire for a massive, historic, and immediate change in behavior regarding GHG 
emissions. The Legislature could have spent many years considering, analyzing, and 
dictating the best way to achieve its ambitious goals. But that delay itself would have 
impeded the goals. Instead, the Legislature chose to pass a flexible bill, with the understanding 
that the Board, as the agency with expertise in air quality matters, was better equipped to 
study the problem and design a program to effectuate those goals.”). 
51. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38501(a)-(b) (West 2020). 
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change by creating new solutions that were innovative, “placing California at
the forefront of national and international efforts.”52 
Finally, CARB could regulate land use as a matter of reasonableness
and public policy. The largest portion of California’s emissions comes 
from transportation, and in order to reach the new goals from SB 32 and 
maximize the state’s GHG reductions, CARB must regulate vehicle miles 
traveled. CARB’s Scoping Plan explicitly recognizes that without 
improvements in VMT, CARB will not be able to meet its goal of 40% 
reductions below 1990 levels by 2030.53  Again, California’s health, economy, 
and beauty are at stake, and the purely local approach to regulating land 
use has produced the current vehicle miles traveled problem. 
However, the Legislature will often state an intent to move into new 
fields of regulation explicitly when it intends to fill them. This is especially
so with land use: a traditionally local power with historically minimal state 
interference. Although the Legislature has enacted statutes that altered the 
land use procedures localities must use, the Legislature has largely left
land use free from dominating state mandates. In fact, in other statutes,
the Legislature has stated its intent not to supersede land use powers of 
local governments.54 In AB 32, when the Legislature created a revolutionary 
new regulatory scheme with cap and trade, it directed CARB through 
explicit text.55 The fact that the Legislature did not direct CARB through
explicit text to regulate land use could indicate the Legislature did not 
intend for CARB to regulate in this way. 
Despite the apparent lack of legislative intent, it remains plausible that
AB 32 is such a broad delegation of authority that the Legislature does not
need to explicitly state anything regarding land use. The Legislature
delegated broad authority to CARB, meaning that it does not matter if AB 
52. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38501(c) (West 2020) (enacting an unprecedented 
carbon cap and trade program using AB 32, showing willingness to explore entirely new 
solutions to climate change.). 
53. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN: THE
STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING CALIFORNIA’S 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS TARGET 75 (Nov. 2017), 
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic//cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZFL3-9Z9Z].
54. See infra pp. 83, 85 (discussing AB 1493 and SB 375). 
55. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38562(c) (West 2020) (explicitly granting additional 
authority; however a market-based compliance system like cap and trade truly is a novel 
field that arguably required an explicit delegation. It may be argued regulating land use is 
of a different magnitude than cap and trade. Authority to regulate some aspects of land use 
arguably would not require an explicit delegation to the same degree as cap and trade.). 
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32 did not directly contemplate land use because AB 32 delegated the 
Legislatures power to CARB to deal with the issue as CARB, the expert,
deemed fit. Based on the urgency of the issue and the broad delegation of 
power, as is supported further by the following section in identifying 
“sources,” the Legislature intended that CARB should have whatever
authority it deems necessary to accomplish its goal. 
b. Land Use Inefficiencies as a “Source” Under AB 32 
CARB can regulate land use inefficiencies as a source of GHG emissions 
because AB 32 broadly defines “source” as: 
[A]ny source, or category of sources, of greenhouse gas emissions whose 
emissions are at a level of significance, as determined by the state board, that its
participation in the program established under this division will enable the state 
board to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions and monitor compliance 
with the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit.56 
First, AB 32 states that a “source” can be any source or category of 
sources. This phrasing broadens the conceptualization of the definition 
because “source” can be a whole category. Second, AB 32 defines “source”
as a source “as determined by the state board.” Here, the Legislature
explicitly gave CARB the discretionary authority to define sources based
on its own volition. The Legislature is saying a “source” is any “source as 
defined by CARB.” The only defining limitation on CARB’s discretionary
authority is the requirement that CARB determine the source’s emissions
are significant enough that CARB could reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and monitor the reduction. Even in this limitation, it is important to note
that CARB has complete discretion to make these determinations. 
Under this definition of source, inefficient land use patterns are undeniably 
a source, so long as CARB determines them to be a source and supports 
its decision with persuasive evidence.57 CARB must only determine that
land use inefficiencies create significant enough emissions that their 
regulation would reduce the state’s emissions and that CARB can monitor 
these reductions. Indubitably, land use patterns such as exclusion of housing 
developments increase transportation emissions58 and the emissions reductions
would be feasible to monitor via VMT. Therefore, CARB can determine 
that land use inefficiencies are a source under AB 32. 
That said, phrases like “effectively reduce GHGs” and “monitoring
compliance” would pose a challenge to CARB defining land use inefficiencies
56. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38505(i) (West 2020). 
57. Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. State Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1494 
(2012).
58. See MALACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 81. 
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as a source. To establish land use inefficiencies as a source under this
language, CARB would need to show that its regulation of land use 
inefficiencies would allow CARB to effectively reduce GHGs and
monitor compliance with statewide goals. It may be difficult for CARB 
to make this showing because emissions from land use inefficiencies are
difficult to measure and monitor – the emissions (in the form of VMT) 
come from the population’s travel habits. On these grounds, opponents
could attack CARB’s designation of land use efficiencies as a “source”
under the text of AB 32.
CARB could address this potential “monitoring” and measurement 
weakness by building a record that sets forth the current measurements of
VMT emissions and establishes a way to accurately measure these emissions. 
One could imagine a measurement system comprised of surveys to residents
asking for data on transportation patterns or recording the number of cars 
that travel a particular stretch of road on a given day, taking into account
the area’s population. Ultimately, CARB has the discretion to determine 
that land use inefficiencies meet the definition of a “source.” The only
limits on this discretion are that CARB must build an evidentiary record
to support the conclusions that they are monitorable and will help CARB 
reduce the state’s GHGs.
c. Judicial Review of CARB’s Land Use Regulations Under Yamaha
Local government agencies would inevitably attack CARB’s regulations 
aimed at curbing vehicle miles traveled, but a court would likely sustain 
them under Yamaha review. California’s administrative doctrine differs 
from federal administrative doctrine when it comes to reviewing an
agency’s authority under its enabling statute. Federal law uses a high
standard of deference to the agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute,59 
whereas California’s Supreme Court has created a confusing combination 
of “independent judicial review” that is either highly limited or varyingly
deferential depending on the type of agency action being reviewed.60 
In Yamaha, the California Supreme Court laid forth the judicial standard 
for reviewing agency rules. The review depends on whether the rules are 
“interpretive” or “quasi-legislative.” The Court reviewed the weight of a 
59. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (discussing Chevron
deference). 
60. See generally Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1
(1998); see generally Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 785 (1999). 
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legal opinion prepared by the State Board of Equalization staff, and
determined that the agency action did not deserve judicial deference
because it was part of an “interpretive” class of administrative rules.61 The
Court then explained that for interpretive rules, an agency does deserve 
variable judicial deference depending on whether the agency has expertise 
and technical knowledge, and whether the interpretation is “probably 
correct.”62 The Court differentiated interpretive rules from “quasi-legislative” 
rules that implicate the exercise of a delegated lawmaking power.63 In the
case of quasi-legislative rules, a court should afford the rules the “dignity 
of statutes,” assessing their validity with a narrow scope of review because 
the agency has been delegated the Legislature’s lawmaking power and is 
truly making law.64 
The Court added to its Yamaha review in Ramirez, recognizing that most 
agency rules actually fall somewhere in a “continuum” between interpretation 
and quasi-legislation, and applied both tests to justify upholding an agency 
rule.65 The Court decided that if a regulation is adopted pursuant to a 
delegation of legislative power, judicial review “is limited to determining 
whether the regulation (1) is ‘within the scope of the authority conferred’ 
[citation] and (2) is ‘reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute.’”66 On the other hand, if the rule interprets a statute or regulation,
the Court added a finger on the scale for deference depending on whether 
the rule goes through public notice and comment rulemaking, and whether 
the interpretation has a longstanding history.67 If a California court is
unsure which side of the continuum an agency rule falls closer to, it will 
likely apply both tests to the rule.68 
CARB’s regulations regarding land use inefficiencies would likely fall
within the quasi-legislative category of review because AB 32 grants such
broad discretion to CARB in regulating sources of emissions. The ultimate 
question in this category of review is whether the Legislature broadly
delegated the power to make law to the agency, such that the agency can
fill gaps and make important policy decisions.69 
There are two stages to quasi-legislative regulatory review. First, the 
reviewing court investigates whether the regulation exceeds statutory
61. Yamaha, 19 Cal. 4th at 15. 
62. Id. at 12. 
63. Id. at 11. 
64. Id. at 10. 
65. Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 799. 
66. Id. at 800. 
67. Id. at 801. 
68. See New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Pub. Util. Comm’n., 246 Cal. App.
4th 784, 811 (2016). 
69. Id. at 810 (referring to J. Mosk’s concurrence adopted in Ramirez). 
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authority by using the language and intent of the statute to guide its 
investigation.70 CARB regulations aimed at reducing emissions from land
use inefficiencies would be well within AB 32’s delegation of discretionary 
authority to regulate GHG emissions. As discussed above,71 AB 32 has
delegated exceptionally broad discretionary authority to CARB to reduce 
California’s GHGs, and has defined the sources CARB is able to regulate 
equally broadly. The plain language would indicate that the Legislature 
delegated to CARB the power to make law. Also, the Legislature declared 
its strongest intent in the beginning of AB 32: to protect California’s health, 
economy, and natural resources from the serious threat of global warming
by reducing California’s emissions. The Legislature also desired to lead the
nation and the world in GHG reduction efforts. Therefore, the Legislature
delegated broad authority to CARB to fulfill these purposes.
That said, CARB’s regulation of land use might exceed the authority of
AB 32 because AB 32 does not expressly authorize or consider regulation 
of land use. The Legislature will often explicitly state an intent to move 
into new fields of regulation when they intend to fill them. Although the 
Legislature has enacted statutes altering the land use procedures that 
localities must use, the Legislature has largely left land use free from state 
mandates. In fact, in other statutes, the Legislature has stated its intent not 
to supersede land use powers of local governments.72 It is possible the 
statute does not delegate total discretionary power to CARB. Therefore, 
CARB may not get a limited standard of review. Instead, CARB may 
receive the interpretational standard of review in which CARB’s position 
would not be supported by deference. 
Second, the reviewing court investigates whether the regulations are 
reasonably necessary to fulfill the statute’s purpose. Here, courts will
consider whether there is evidence to show necessity. Regulations aimed
at reducing emissions from land use inefficiencies are absolutely necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of AB 32 because the transportation sector
accounts for the largest portion of GHG emissions in the state, and CARB 
has already addressed most other sources of emissions. SB 32 makes land
use regulations more necessary because it demands more stringent reductions
70. See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1, 11 (1998). 
71. See supra at p. 72. 
72. See supra Part IV, Section A.1.d; see infra Part IV, Section B.1. 
 77

















      
    
   
     
      
in GHG emissions.73 CARB’s Scoping Plan explicitly recognizes that
curbing vehicle miles traveled is essential to reaching the ambitious goals 
set by the Legislature.74 The standard of review only calls for “reasonable”
necessity. CARB can meet this standard by showing the data on emissions 
from VMT. 
Even if a reviewing court decided that CARB’s regulation of land use 
inefficiencies was closer to the interpretive side of the continuum, the 
regulation would likely still withstand challenge. First, CARB would
automatically have a thumb on the scale for deference because it would 
have passed the regulation using public notice and comment rulemaking. 
Second, CARB has particular technical expertise in measuring, monitoring, 
and regulating GHGs, that would translate into a better interpretation of 
how broadly the statute should be construed. This technical expertise 
would likely earn CARB some degree of deference. 
However, a court could use Yamaha more than Ramirez and focus on 
the fact that interpretations sometimes deserve no judicial deference. 
Working under Yamaha, a court could decide that CARB’s interpretation 
was not incorrect and undermine CARB’s variable deference. The case 
would then be decided on the merits of statutory interpretation for de novo 
judicial review, as discussed in the textual analysis of AB 32, above.75 
Overall, the Legislature expressly conferred power to fill the details of 
the statutory scheme by delegating discretionary authority to CARB to 
define “sources” and regulate them whenever they would amount to a 
significant reduction. The only limit the Legislature placed on CARB was
that it consider the policies set forth in AB 32 when enacting such regulations. 
Therefore, CARB could succeed in defending its regulations. 
d. AB 32’s “No Alteration of Other Programs” Clause 
AB 32 contains a rather hidden provision in Part Five, “Market-Based
Compliance Mechanisms,” that could prevent CARB from regulating land 
use.76 Because the clause has no context or previous judicial analysis, it is
unclear how a court would rule on its interpretation. 
The clause specifies that “[n]othing in this part or Part 4 . . . confers 
any authority on the state board to alter any programs administered by 
other state agencies for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.”77 Part
73. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2020) (“[T]he state board
shall ensure that statewide greenhouse gas emissions are reduced to at least 40 percent 
below the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit no later than December 31, 2030.”). 
74. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 53, at 75. 
75. See supra Part IV, Section A.1.
 76. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38574 (West 2020). 
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38574 (West 2020). 
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Four is where the Legislature delegates most of CARB’s authority, so this 
provision could limit CARB’s authority depending on its interpretation.
Part Five is ambiguous in at least three ways, and it has neither been
interpreted by a court nor is it further defined in the text of AB 32.
First, the word “alter” is vague. It creates an ambiguity as to which 
CARB actions would be sufficiently impactful to “alter” another program 
for the purposes of this section. This limitation on CARB’s ability to alter 
other state agency programs poses an issue for potential land use 
regulation because there are some other state agencies that have programs 
regarding housing and traffic.78 CARB could argue that “alter” means
“directly changing” another program, such as enacting regulations that 
interfere with a current program. However, “alter” may mean taking any 
action that changes the current state of the field that a program regulates.
If CARB were to use incentives and penalties to mandate that localities 
meet regional housing goals, it would likely fall in the middle of the two 
definitions because it would essentially alter the strictness of the regional
housing needs program, but it would not interfere with the program or
change the interactions that localities have with other state agencies.
CARB could bolster its position in this situation by creating its own new 
standards for local housing supply that are separate from the regional 
housing needs goals, and enforce those new standards. CARB could create 
its own standards for available housing as a part of the land use inefficiency
GHG rulemaking that would be separate from the regional housing goals 
program. This CARB- created standard would be a defensibly independent
scheme from any other existing housing laws because it would be based 
on CARB’s own evidence and judgment. 
Second, the term “program” is vague and undefined. A “program” could 
merely capture regulatory schemes formally recognized as “programs.” 
Alternatively, “program” could mean any regulatory scheme administered
by another state agency. The argument as to this term’s definition would 
likely be taken up in the dispute about legislative intent and the clause’s 
meaning as a whole, as considered below. 
Third, it is unclear whether the language “[CARB cannot] alter any 
programs administered by other state agencies for the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions” means that (1) CARB is forbidden from altering any
program administered by a state agency when CARB is doing so to reduce 
78. See CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ABOUT US (2020), https://dot.ca.gov/about-caltrans
[https://perma.cc/7KCA-GW99]. 
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greenhouse gas emissions, or (2) whether CARB cannot alter any program 
administered by a state agency when that other state agency is reducing
greenhouse gas emissions through such a program. If the GHG reduction 
purpose applies to CARB’s actions, the clause is rather broad. However,
if the GHG reduction purpose applies to the other state agencies’ actions,
it is rather narrow because there are not many other state agency programs
to reduce greenhouse gases.
The argument over each of these terms would likely come down to a
matter of intent (based on location in the text) and policy. CARB would 
argue that this clause is disconnected from the main substantive delegations 
and restrictions because it is hidden away in Part 5. CARB would reason
the clause was an afterthought that was not meant to impede its power in
a significant way, or else it would have been contemplated up top in the 
main provisions of AB 32. CARB would also argue that, practically, the 
Legislature would not have created such a bold delegation of power to 
meet such a pressing state need and then severely limit CARB by broadly 
defining the terms contemplated by this clause.
Even so, this clause may be located exactly where the Legislature meant
it to be. Although Part 5 is not the main action section delegating and 
restricting authority to CARB, it is not necessarily “hidden away” either; 
it appears within AB 32 itself. Further, it should not matter where the 
clause is located because it carries the same force and effect regardless of
where it is located. Lastly, AB 32, interpreted broadly, delegates an
unprecedented amount of power to a California agency. Therefore, it is
not absurd to think that this provision was meant to curb the incredible 
delegation to CARB. 
Again, it is unclear how a court would rule on the interpretation of this 
clause because this clause has little context and no existing judicial
analysis. 
2. Preemption 1: Could AB 32 Preempt Local Laws that Significantly 
Contribute to Climate Change? 
Arguing and establishing preemption is only necessary to allow CARB
to pass regulations that directly override local land use regulations.
Therefore, this section and the following preemption sections mainly apply 
to the first action recommended by this Article; compelling local jurisdictions 
to increase housing density near public transit. When interpreting statutes 
to determine preemption, courts constructed a strong presumption against 
preempting land use regulations.79 Court are likely to hang their judgment 
on this presumption unless CARB convinces the court the bases for the 
79. See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. Cty. of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821, 827 (Cal. 2006). 
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presumption is eroded such that the presumption should no longer apply.80 
Preemption is largely beyond the scope of this paper. Accordingly, the
following is a cursory overview of arguments CARB could make to 
overcome the presumption against land use preemption.
AB 32 may impliedly preempt some aspects of local land use control
which cause GHG emissions by increasing vehicle miles traveled. Courts 
look to the purpose and scope legislative schemes to determine whether 
there is implied preemption of local regulation.81 One test is whether “the 
subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such 
terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate 
further or additional local action.”82 A second test is whether “the subject
matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such 
a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens 
of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.”83 A third 
test is whether a conflict exists between a local regulation and general 
laws. “Local legislation in conflict with general law is void.”84 Conflict 
exists if local law “contradicts” general law.85 
Under the first test, the subject matter covered by AB 32 (GHGs changing 
the planet’s climate), and the way in which the subject matter is covered 
(by incredibly broad delegation of authority) indicate that this is a “paramount
state concern” that will not tolerate further local action that significantly 
contributes to GHG emissions. Under the second test, the subject matter 
(GHGs changing the planet’s climate) is of such a nature (deadly to sensitive 
populations)86 that the adverse effect of a local ordinance (causing more 
vehicle miles traveled GHGs through exclusionary land use practices and 
contributing to the deadly phenomenon of climate change) on transient 
citizens of the state (either figuratively ALL citizens, OR literally the 
80. Id.; see infra at p. 88 for discussion of the erosion of the presumption against land 
use preemption. 
81.  Morehart v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 7 Cal.4th 725, 751 (1994). 
82. Id.
 83. Id.
 84. Id. at 747. 
85. Id.
 86. See Umair Irfan, The Disturbing Reason Heat Waves Can Kill People in 
Cooler Climates, VOX (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/18/17561266/summer-
2018-heat-wave-japan-texas-weather-health [https://perma.cc/AN68-BJS4]. (“Most of the
people who died as [the 2018 Canada heatwave] reached temperatures up to 95 degrees are 
elderly men and women living alone in apartments with no air conditioning, and many had 
chronic health conditions.”). 
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sensitive homeless population) outweighs the possible benefit to the 
municipality (maintaining “community character”). Under the third test, 
local regulations that exclude housing, or allow cities discretion to exclude 
housing, are in conflict with AB 32. These regulations contradict AB 32 and
SB 32 because they are a source of GHG emissions that must be addressed
in order to successfully reach California’s emission reduction goals.87 
Succeeding on the issue of preemption would be challenging because a
presumption against preemption exists in the area of land use as a result 
of the largely local tradition of land use.88 Regardless of tradition, the
Legislature intended for CARB to address the new problems posed by climate 
change by creating new innovative solutions, “placing California at the 
forefront of national and international efforts.”89 Additionally, the Legislature’s 
broad delegation of authority allows CARB to intrude on lesser-regulated 
areas like land use.90 
3. Preemption 2: Can CARB’s Regulations Under AB 32 Preempt 
Aspects of Local Land Use Authority that Significantly
Contribute to Climate Change? 
Although it is unusual for a court to find that a state agency’s regulations
preempt local ordinances, courts have considered such a finding.91 When
the Legislature delegates broad discretionary authority to an agency so the 
agency can accomplish a particular purpose, the agency should be able to 
preempt local regulations thwarting that purpose.
However, it may be that CARB regulations cannot preempt local 
ordinances. There is no law on point which allows a state agency to promulgate
regulations preempting local ordinances. Also, preemptive agency regulation 
may be unsuccessful in this particular case because there is a judicial 
presumption against preemption in the context of land use. Presumption
against preemption in land use has proven extremely compelling in past 
87. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE
SCOPING PLAN 75 (2017). 
88. See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. Cty. of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821, 827 (Cal. 2006). 
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(c) (West 2020). 
90.  AB 32 was a monumental step into previously unregulated territory, especially
in its establishment of carbon cap and trade. If CARB can create such an unprecedented 
scheme as cap and trade, surely CARB can regulate land use. Although it could be argued that 
the Legislature spoke to cap and trade because they wanted to affirmatively give that power, it 
can equally be argued that the Legislature spoke to cap and trade because they wanted to 
limit CARB’s actions there. 
91. See Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 128 (1971 
(finding nothing related to the topic of an agency’s power to preempt. The most likely reason 
for a lack of caselaw on this topic is that the Legislature does not often give state agencies such 
broad discretionary delegations of authority as the one in AB 32.). 
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cases.92 This presumption may be enough to shut down CARB’s argument
if a court is unpersuaded that traditional local control over land use has 
been eroded by recent legislative action.93 
AB 32 delegated broad legislative power to CARB to control the 
impending threat of climate change. CARB can use this power to make
state laws which preempt local regulations. Federal agencies can preempt
state regulations despite the limits of federalism. The federal government 
is limited by enumerated powers, with all other power reserved to the
states.94 Federal agencies are delegated limited authority from the already 
limited powers the Constitution grants to Congress. In California law, 
there are no such limitations on agency power because the cities and counties 
did not create the state in the same way the states created the federal 
government. CARB essentially wields state legislative power within the 
confines the legislature established to fulfill a statutory duty. In pursuit of 
this duty, CARB must be able to preempt local regulations when they 
conflict with CARB’s goal to reduce California’s GHGs. This issue is a 
matter of statewide concern because local control has caused the problem. 
4. Does AB 1493 Limit CARB’s Authority Under AB 32?
a. The Interplay Between AB 1493 and AB 32
AB 1493 was California’s first legislation that sought to reduce GHG 
emissions. At that stage, the Legislature intended to deal only with automotive 
emissions through automotive technology.95 AB 1493 provides that “the
state board shall develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum 
feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 
motor vehicles.”96 AB 1493 then limited CARB’s actions by specifying 
that regulations passed pursuant to the section quoted above shall not 
require “the imposition of additional fees and taxes on any motor vehicle, 
fuel, or vehicle miles traveled, pursuant to this section or any other provision 
of law,” or “[a] limitation on, or reduction of, vehicle miles traveled.”97 
92. See Big Creek Lumber Co., 136 P.3d at 827. 
93. See infra at p. 88.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
 95. See  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2020) (focusing only on
“technological solutions to GHG emissions,” continuing “the tradition of building cars that use 
cutting edge technology”). 
96. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2003). 
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43918.5(d) (West 2003). 
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Although AB 1493 limited CARB’s power to regulate automotive 
emissions at the time of its passage, the Legislature has since passed new
statutes that delegate much broader regulatory authority to CARB without 
the restrictions from AB 1493. For example, AB 32 granted exceedingly 
broad discretion to CARB to regulate any source of emissions.98 The
Legislature has since become more concerned with climate change, showing 
its “desire for a massive, historic, and immediate change in behavior regarding 
GHG emissions” by passing AB 32.99 While AB 1493 may still direct 
CARB’s actions in regulating automotive technology and emissions per-
vehicle, AB 32 has overridden AB 1493 in the sense CARB can now regulate 
any other source of emissions - including land use inefficiencies - in accordance 
with AB 32. 
Nevertheless, AB 1493 may apply broadly to encompass all regulation 
of motor vehicles and proposed CARB actions targeting VMT through
land use inefficiencies. AB 1493 could prohibit the land use inefficiencies 
CARB seeks to regulate because AB 1493 explicitly prohibited CARB 
from touching VMT. Admittedly, it is not exceedingly clear that AB 1493
does not apply to CARB’s current actions taken pursuant to other programs. 
AB 1493 still directs CARB’s implementation of the Clean Cars Program.100 
CARB can counter this argument by pointing to the apparent purposes 
of AB 1493 and its restrictions. The purpose of AB 1493 was to regulate 
vehicles themselves, not the land use that underpins their travel. By the 
text of the delegation and restrictions, the Legislature apparently feared
CARB would start regulating vehicles and vehicle owners on the basis of 
VMT, and limit or tax the miles a person or vehicle could travel per day. 
CARB’s contemplated regulations aimed at land use inefficiencies are not 
aimed at imposing restrictions on the average person. Instead, they aim to 
impose restrictions on local governments to benefit the average person. 
AB 1493 was explicitly designed to regulate vehicle efficiency without 
directly impacting the average consumer. This goal is made clear by the 
delegation and restrictions in AB 1493. Also, AB 1493’s intent is outdated 
and has arguably been superseded by the newer intent expressed in AB 32
(to cover any other sources of emissions). 
Lastly, canons of interpretation that could reconcile AB 32 and AB 
1493 are in conflict and do not prove very useful. One canon provides that 
98. See People v. Arias, 45 Cal. 4th 169, 177 (2008) (discussing the traditional canons 
of statutory construction and how under these canons, AB 32 delegates broad discretionary 
authority to CARB) 
99. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604, 626 (2017). 
100. CALIFORNIA’S GREENHOUSE GAS VEHICLE EMISSION STANDARDS UNDER ASSEMBLY 
BILL 1497 OF 2002 (PAVLEY), CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (2020), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/
cc/ccms/ccms.htm, [https://perma.cc/P4AL-3587]. 
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specific statutory provisions trump general ones. Therefore, the specific
language of AB 1493 would prohibit CARB from touching VMTs. However, 
another canon provides that later laws (here, AB 32) trump earlier ones.
Because it is hard to reconcile these canons, they may not prove the best 
way to decide the case. Instead, it is more helpful to look to the text of AB 
1493.
b. Actions Taken “Pursuant to” AB 32
Although AB 1493’s language restricts regulations regarding vehicle 
miles traveled and land use, the restrictions only apply to regulations 
passed pursuant to AB 1493.101 Because CARB’s actions regulating land 
use would be taken pursuant to AB 32 or SB 375, they would not be subject 
to AB 1493’s restrictions. AB 1493 drove CARB to develop a particular 
set of regulations aimed at curbing automotive emission through technological 
improvements. Although that regulatory scheme continues, CARB and 
the Legislature have formulated new regulatory schemes not confined within 
the bounds of AB 1493.102 AB 1493 is not the end-all statute for transportation
emissions. This is evidenced by AB 32’s broad discretion and the Legislature 
passing SB 375 which directly contemplates transportation emissions.103 
B. SB 375: Does SB 375 Support CARB’s Ability to Regulate 
Emissions Based on VMT? 
The Legislature contemplated land use and VMT emissions recently in 
SB 375. In addition, it created a judicial enforcement mechanism that CARB 
may be able to use to encourage housing development.
1. Legislative Intent of SB 375
SB 375 was enacted in part to reduce transportation emissions from 
VMT. The Legislature recognized that “even taking [new vehicle technology
and low carbon fuel] into account, it will be necessary to achieve significant
101. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(c) (West 2020) (Stating that CARB 
may not impose land use restrictions when allowing compliance flexibility with the technological 
regulations passed under AB 1493, and (d) provides that the regulations adopted by the 
state board pursuant to AB 1493 shall not require fees/taxes on, or limitations on, vehicle 
miles traveled.). 
102. Examples include carbon cap and trade & sustainable community development. 
103. S.B. 375 § 1(c), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal 2008).
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additional greenhouse gas reductions from changed land use patterns and 
improved transportation.”104 The Legislature stated that “[w]ithout improved
land use and transportation policy, California will not be able to achieve 
the goals of AB 32.”105 
SB 375 serves a crucial purpose in supplementing the Legislature’s idea 
of the scope of AB 32 and eroding the tradition of land use’s local nature. 
SB 375 only directly implicated CARB in two capacities: (1) setting 
emissions targets and (2) approving Sustainable Communities Strategies. 
However, because the Legislature implicated CARB, the Legislature must 
be open to CARB getting involved in land use.106 SB 375 reallocated a 
piece of local discretion in land use decisions to state-level actors. This 
allocation a turn in the “tradition” of land use and weakens the “traditional” 
presumptions against CARB. 
On the other hand, the Legislature wrote SB 375 contemplating VMT 
emission and land use inefficiencies. The fact that the Legislature did not 
explicitly grant CARB (or any other agency) the authority to regulate land 
use or VMT while it was contemplating these issues cuts against CARB’s 
ability to regulate land use or VMT. In fact, SB 375 actually contained 
language that indicated SB 375’s programs shall not supersede local land 
use authority.107 The Legislative intent at the time SB 375 was written was 
not to interfere with land use in any binding manner. On this basis, SB 
375 prohibits CARB from regulating land use in any way. 
Although SB 375 contains explicit language that could be used to argue
CARB cannot regulate land use, CARB could overcome these arguments 
by pointing out the context in which the language appears. SB 375 states 
that “[n]othing in a sustainable communities strategy shall be interpreted 
as superseding the exercise of land use authority of cities and counties 
within the region.”108 Essentially these sustainable communities strategies 
are nonbinding on local governments.109 For two reasons this language
does not preclude CARB from creating general land use regulations to 
increase land use efficiency with respect to vehicle miles traveled. 
First, the language only explicitly says that the new sustainable 
communities’ strategies created under SB 375 are subject to the restrictive 
language. It does not subject other agency actions taken pursuant to other 
statutes to this narrow interpretation. If the Legislature wished to exclude 
104. Id.
 105. Id.
 106. See John Darakjian, SB 375: Promise, Compromise and the New Urban Landscape, 
27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371, 372 (2009) (analyzing CARB’s direct role in S.B. 375). 
107.  S.B. 375 § 4; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65080(b)(2)(J) (West 2020). 
108. Id.
109.  S.B. 375 § 4; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65080(b)(2)(J) (West 2020). 
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CARB’s actions from entering land use, it would have done so more
explicitly. Instead of limiting CARB’s authority, it limited the interpretation
of the sustainable communities’ strategy, and nothing more.
Second, the restrictive language in the context of SB 375 shows only
that new comprehensive plans created by regional planning agencies 
should not usurp local planning authority. This bill allows comprehensive 
planning documents to be made parallel to the localities’ planning documents. 
The Legislature wanted to clarify that the new comprehensive SCS plans
are only to help guide local jurisdictions, not to override them. CARB arguably 
can influence land use decisions by mandating housing near transit or
mandating housing with an incentive/penalty system as long as localities 
maintain ultimate discretion to choose exactly how and where to implement
these mandates.
2. Judicial Enforcement Through SB 375 
The third action recommended by this paper is based on the judicial 
enforcement mechanism the Legislature built into SB 375. The strength 
of this recommendation is that CARB does not have to go through the 
process of rulemaking and designing its own land use regulations to pit 
against local regulations. Instead, CARB would take legal action as an
“interested party” because of its goals from AB 32 and SB 32 to challenge 
certain local actions that preclude housing developments. 
SB 375 creates a cause of action to enforce mandatory inclusive zoning 
for localities that do not have adequate sites zoned to accommodate housing 
need for all income levels.110 The Legislature created broad standing for
enforcement: if a local government fails to complete the mandated rezone 
by the applicable deadline, “any interested person” may bring an action to 
enforce the zoning provisions.111 The phrase “any interested person” is
used in many California statutes to alter legal standing and the term can 
take on different meanings in different contexts.112 
110. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583(g)(3) (West 2020) (containing the enforcement
mechanism); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583(c)(1)(A) (contains the specifications to be to be 
enforced). 
111. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583(g)(3).
112. See In re Harootenian’s Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 247 (1951) (referring to “any
interested person” in a probate statute includes “one which has an interest of a pecuniary 
nature” that can be impaired or benefited by the proceeding); see also Associated Boat 
Industries of Northern Cal. v. Marshall, 104 Cal. App. 2d 21, 22 (1951) (during challenges to 
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CARB meets the “any interested person” standing, especially as it
applies to the context of fulfilling the purposes of SB 32. Under SB 32 
CARB has been tasked with keeping California at the forefront of national 
and international efforts to mitigate climate change to directly protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of Californians. SB 32 requires CARB to 
reduce California’s greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 1990 levels 
by 2030.113 CARB has a direct interest in anything that increases state
greenhouse gas emissions, including land use inefficiencies, because the 
Legislature tasked CARB with reaching the greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction mandates. 
C. Has Recent Legislation Eroded the Traditionally  
Local Land Use Regime? 
California has begun to significantly erode local land use authority in 
recent legislative sessions.114 This erosion is causing the “tradition” of
total local land use control to quickly fade away which will allow CARB 
to regulate this area with less judicial resistance.115 The most noteworthy 
recent Legislation eroding local control is SB 330, the “Housing Crisis 
Act of 2019.” This bill cuts the time local governments have to grant
building permits, bars local governments from reducing the number of 
homes that can be built, bars local governments from changing permit 
requirements once an applicant has submitted preliminary information, 
and limits the number of public hearings a local government can impose
on an application to a maximum of five.116 The bill removes a large chunk 
of local government discretion to prolong or deny a development project. 
These intrusions into the previously undisturbed temple of local land use 
authority could signal the beginning of the end of a local land use tradition, 
bolstering CARB’s argument that it can pass regulations that influence 
land use decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION
CARB must move toward regulating vehicle miles traveled to accomplish 
SB 32’s emissions mandate, and CARB has defensible positions under 
state regulations “any interested person” is “a person having a direct, and not merely a 
consequential, interest in the litigation.”).
113. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2020). 
114. See Infranca, supra note 7, at 848. 
115. See Big Creek Lumber Co., 38 Cal. 4th 1139, 1148 (2006) (indicating courts are 
resistant to allow state agencies to enter areas traditionally regulated by local governments 
without explicit statutory authority for fear the Legislature will undermine the tradition of total 
local control). 
116. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5 (West 2020); see Skinner, supra note 22. 
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AB 32 and SB 375 that it can take to begin reducing vehicle miles traveled. 
A state-wide regulatory approach is the best way to minimize externalities 
from exclusionary localism in land use decisions. Enacting regulations to 
override local housing authority would be challenging, but not impossible. 
Initiating enforcement actions using SB 375 would have a good chance of 
success. Although taking actions relating to land use may have been daunting
years ago, the local land use tradition has been significantly eroded such
that agency action in the area would not be surprising. 
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